Optimal Tax Policies with Private-Public Clean-Up, Cross-Border Pollution and Capital Mobility by Costas Hadjiyiannis et al.
OPTIMAL TAX POLICIES WITH PRIVATE-PUBLIC





CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 822
CATEGORY 7: TRADE POLICY
DECEMBER 2002
An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded
• from the SSRN website: www.SSRN.com
• from the CESifo website: www.CESifo.deCESifo Working Paper No. 822
OPTIMAL TAX POLICIES WITH PRIVATE-
PUBLIC CLEAN-UP, CROSS-BORDER
POLLUTION AND CAPITAL MOBILITY
Abstract
This paper builds a model of a region with two non-identical countries, cross-border pollution
and free movements of goods and capital within the region. Pollution reduces welfare and
there is simultaneous private and public pollution abatement. Public pollution abatement is
financed with the use of lump-sum and pollution tax revenue. The introduction of public
pollution abatement enables us to derive the optimal pollution taxes in terms of the marginal
cost of public pollution abatement. We derive and compare for each country the Nash and
cooperative lump-sum and pollution taxes and examine how cross-border pollution and
capital mobility affect them. Finally, we examine the impact of capital mobility on the
effectiveness of pollution taxes on net pollution.
JEL Classification: F18, F22, H21.









Dept of Int. and European
Economic Studies
Athens University of Economics
and Business











The liberalization of capital markets in the last few decades has raised concerns over
the impact of capital mobility on the global environment. Environmentalists claim that
some countries in an eﬀort to attract foreign capital lower their environmental standards
and become “pollution havens”.1 This may lead to a “race to the bottom” in environ-
mental standards worldwide. In addition, since the eﬀects of pollution generated in one
country are not conﬁned within the geographical borders of that country (i.e. cross-border
pollution), this “race to the bottom” may lead to a deterioration of the quality of the
environment even in countries with strict environmental standards.2 As a result of these
and other concerns, a number of international conferences has been staged (e.g., the UN
conferences in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and in Kyoto in 1997, the OECD conference of
foreign direct investment and the environment in the Hague in 1999) in order to address
these issues.3
In light of the above considerations, a literature has emerged studying the impact of
capital mobility on the environment.4 For example, Merriﬁeld (1988) in a two-country
general equilibrium model with international ﬂows of goods, capital and pollution, exam-
ines appropriate abatement strategies for reducing cross-border pollution. It is shown,
among other things, that an attempt to reduce pollution by means of higher pollution
taxes may raise pollution. Copeland (1994) shows that the welfare gains of reforming
pollution policy are greater in an economy with capital mobility. Copeland and Taylor
(1997) examine the impact of capital mobility on the level of pollution in a two-good
(a labor-using “clean” good and a capital-using “dirty” good) North-South model with
local pollution. They demonstrate among other things that allowing for free international
1For example, Gray (1997) using US data ﬁnds signiﬁcant negative correlation between new plant
location and inter-state diﬀerences in environmental regulation.
2Rauscher (1991) notes that, in the absence of cross-border pollution, such competition among coun-
tries may not pose a problem from an economic theory point of view, as long as it reﬂects the countries’
preferences. But, with cross-border pollution, matters may actually be diﬀerent, since a country with
tight environmental controls suﬀers the consequences of such policies (e.g., lower capital endowment) but
m a yn o te n j o yt h e i rb e n e ﬁts (i.e., cleaner environment).
3Jaﬀe, Peterson, Portney, and Stanvis (1995), Grossman and Krueger (1993), Tobey (1990) and
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) argue that the empirical evidence does not support the “pollution
haven” hypothesis.
4Another strand of the literature examines the welfare and policy implications of cross-border pollution
e.g., Markusen (1975), Copeland and Taylor (1995), Copeland (1996), Ludema and Wooton (1997), Silva
and Caplan (1997) .capital mobility, world pollution rises (falls) when the North initially exports the dirty
(clean) good. Rauscher (1991) and Rauscher (1997) using a model with two countries,
one good and cross-border pollution examine the eﬀects of increased capital mobility on
the optimal levels of quantitative environmental restrictions (i.e., pollution quotas). It is
shown that when the two countries act non-cooperatively, increased capital exports, move
capital to the country with less restrictive environmental regulations. Global pollution,
however, may be higher or lower relative to the initial situation.5
A common analytical assumption in the above studies is that pollution, a by-product
of production, is entirely abated by the private sector in response to emission taxes on
private producers.6 More often than not, however, pollution emissions are abated partly
by the private and partly by the public sector of a country. Ample empirical evidence
shows that the share of public abatement expenditure in total abatement expenditure is
sizeable and it varies among countries and from one type of pollution to another.7 Thus,
it is important that both types of abatement are taken into consideration in analyzing
environmental policies, especially in light of the fact that emission tax revenue is often
earmarked for pollution abatement activities by governments.8 To the best of our knowl-
edge, with the exception of Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri, and Michael (2002a), the literature
has ignored this issue. They consider the issue of simultaneous provision of private and
public abatement, where the latter activity is ﬁnanced through emission tax revenue but
in a diﬀerent framework.9
The present paper develops a general model incorporating simultaneous public and
private pollution abatement to study the interaction between capital mobility and the
5In a diﬀerent context Chao and Yu (1998) and Chao and Yu (2000) raise other issues regarding the
interaction between international capital mobility and locally abated pollution.
6Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1993) report a number of examples of pollution taxes. Those
include a 1988 tax on fuels in the Netherlands, a 1990 French air pollution tax and a 1990 US tax on the
ozone-depleting factor of a variety of chloroﬂuorocarbons.
7According to OECD statistics, as far as abatement of water pollution in the early 1990s is concerned,
the share of public expenditure in the total expenditure is 66% in the USA and the Netherlands and
only 12% in the UK. As for abatement of air pollution, the share of public abatement in the Netherlands
and the UK is 55% and 30% respectively, but it is only 6% in the case of the USA.
8For example, Brett and Keen (2000) note that, in the US, it is quite customary for environmental
taxes to be earmarked for speciﬁc environment related public expenditure. In particular, such tax
proceeds are commonly paid into trust funds that ﬁnance various clean-up activities, or are spend on
road and public transport networks.
9Chao and Yu (1999) also use public pollution abatement in their model and examine its eﬀect on
welfare when it is ﬁnanced through foreign aid.
2environment. To this end, we construct a general equilibrium model of a region with two
non-identical countries and free commodity and capital ﬂows. We assume that pollution,
a by-product of production, generated in each country is transmitted across borders, and
it is abated partly by the private producers, in response to an emissions tax, and partly
by the local governments. Governments ﬁnance their public pollution abatement activi-
ties using lump-sum and pollution tax revenue. Within this framework, we ﬁrst examine
the eﬀect of pollution taxes on public pollution abatement activity and on net pollution
and compare the results with the existing literature. We then derive the cooperative and
Nash optimal pollution taxes and relate them to the marginal cost of public pollution
abatement. We also analyze how public pollution abatement, capital mobility and dif-
ferences between the two countries aﬀect these taxes. Finally, we extend the analysis to
examine the impact of capital mobility on the eﬀectiveness of the environmental policy.
2 The Analytical Framework
2.1 The Model
We develop a general equilibrium model of two small open economies, home and
foreign, which trade freely with each other and the rest of the world.10 As a result,
commodity prices in the two countries are constant and equal to the world commodity
prices. In both countries pollution of the eyesore type is generated as a by-product of
production, and it is transmitted across national borders. Identical residents, inhabiting
each country, are adversely aﬀected and suﬀer disutility from locally generated pollu-
tion and from pollution emitted by foreign producers and transmitted across borders.
With respect to the ﬂows of factors of production, it is assumed that capital is freely
mobile within the borders of the region, but immobile between the region and the rest
of the world. Finally, other factors of production, such as labor, are intra-regionally and
internationally immobile.11
We proceed to develop the model of the home, capital-importing, country; the model
of the foreign, capital-exporting, country follows analogously. The home country’s maxi-
10Following the standard convention we denote all the variables of the foreign country with an asterisk.
11We conjecture that the model may resemble the case of a region —either with all its members devel-
oped (e.g., EU) or some developed and some developing (e.g., NAFTA)— vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
In such a context, there is free commodity trade within the region, and nearly free commodity trade
between the region and the rest of the world.






x − tz :( x,z,K) ∈ Φ(v,K)}, (1)
where p is the vector of exogenously given world commodity prices, Φ(v,K) is the coun-
try’s aggregate technology set, v i st h ee n d o w m e n tv e c t o ro ft h ei m m o b i l ef a c t o r s ,K is
the domestic supply of capital, x is the vector of net outputs, and z i st h ea m o u n to f
pollution emission by the private sector, net of the amount abated by the private sector.12
In the present analysis, since (v) and (p) are invariant, for notational simpliﬁcation the
revenue function is written as R(t,K). We assume that the R(t,K) function is strictly
concave in K (RKK < 0) and strictly convex in t (Rtt > 0). The latter assumption
implies that a higher emission tax level lowers the amount of pollution emissions by the
private sector. By the envelop theorem, the partial derivative of the revenue function
with respect to K,( i . e . ,RK) is the marginal revenue product of capital, and by the same
theorem, the level of pollution, z, generated by the private sector is given by13
z = −Rt(t,K). (2)
For the rest of the analysis we assume that pollution is capital intensive in both countries,
that is, RtK < 0 and R∗
t∗K∗ < 0.
Accounting for both private and public sector pollution abatement, the overall net
pollution r,a ﬀecting the home country residents is:
r = z − g + Θ(z
∗ − g
∗), (3)
where the parameter Θ ∈ [0,1] is the rate of cross-border pollution or the spillover
parameter, g is the level of public pollution abatement in the home country, and z∗ and
g∗ denote the levels of pollution net of private abatement and the level of public pollution
abatement, respectively, in the foreign country.14
12For simplicity we assume only one type of pollution emission generated in one or more sectors. A
prime (0) denotes a transposed vector or matrix, and p
0
x − tz is the value of factor income. Finally,
Φ(v,K) includes production technologies and abatement technologies in various private sectors, as they
carry out some pollution abatement in response to the emission tax (t).
13Copeland (1994) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (1998), among others, deﬁne pollution in the same
way.
14This formulation of additive level of net pollution, r, implies that the two countries emit the same
4As for the country’s public sector, we assume that it imports from the rest of the world,
at a constant price Pg, a commodity used to provide public pollution abatement at the
level g. The cost of the imported good (i.e.,Pgg), used for public pollution abatement,
is ﬁnanced through the emission tax revenue (i.e.,−tRt(t,K)),a n dl u m p - s u mt a x e s(T).
Thus, the government’s budget constraint is written as:
Pgg = −tRt(t,K)+T. (4)
Turning to the demand side of the economy, we assume that each country is comprised
of identical individuals. Utility is adversely aﬀected by both local and foreign pollution
transmitted across borders. Let E(u,r) denote the minimum expenditure required to
achieve a level of utility, u, at constant prices p, omitted from the expenditure function
for reasons noted earlier, and at the given level of net pollution r. The partial derivative
of the expenditure function with respect to u, Eu, denotes the reciprocal of the marginal
utility of income. Since pollution adversely aﬀects household utility, the partial derivative
of the expenditure function with respect to r, Er, is positive denoting the households’
marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution (e.g. see Chao and Yu (1999)).15
That is, a higher level of net pollution requires a higher level of spending on private goods
to mitigate its detrimental eﬀects so that a constant level of utility is maintained. The
expenditure function is assumed strictly convex in r, i.e. Err > 0. That is, a higher level
of net pollution raises the households’ marginal willingness to pay for its reduction. It is
also assumed that Eru > 0, i.e. a higher level of utility increases the households’ marginal
willingness to pay for pollution abatement.16
The home, capital-importing, country’s budget constraint requires that private spend-
ing E(u,r) must equal factor income from the production of goods R(t,K) minus repatri-
ated earnings of foreign capital domestically employed kfRK(t,K) and lump-sum taxes
T. Thus, the income-expenditure identity for the home country is
E(u,r)=R(t,K) − k
fRK(t,K) − T, (5)
pollutant. Generalizing the present speciﬁcation to one where the two countries emit diﬀerent types of
pollutants only results to unwarranted algebraic complications without providing substantive analytical
insight.
15In Copeland (1994)’s terminology, Er is a measure of the marginal damage to consumers from
pollution.
16This implicitly assumes that pollution abatement is a normal good.
5where kf is the amount of foreign capital operating in the home country.
The model for the foreign country is similarly developed. The corresponding equations































where r∗ is the level of total net pollution for the foreign country, Θ∗ is the rate of cross-
border pollution in that country and K∗ is the supply of capital. By the assumptions of
the model dK = dkf = −dK∗.
Finally, international capital mobility though non-existent between the region and the
rest of the world, is perfect within the region, i.e., between the home and foreign countries.
Since it is assumed that capital earnings are untaxed by both countries, perfect regional
capital mobility equalizes the factor’s reward in the two countries. That is, equilibrium






The system of equations (2)-(10) contains nine unknowns, namely u, u∗, g, g∗, z, z∗,
r, r∗ and K; four —two for each country- policy parameters, namely (t,T) and (t∗,T∗);
and four -two for each country- exogenous parameters, namely (Pg,Θ) and (P∗
g∗,Θ∗).F o r
analytical convenience the above system is reduced to equations (4), (5), (8), (9) and (10),
after appropriately substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (5), and equations
(6) and (7) into equation (9). In doing so the initial system is then solved in terms of ﬁve
unknowns, namely u,u∗,g,g∗, and K. The Appendix of the paper lays out the complete
comparative statics of this reduced form system.
2.2 Pollution Taxes and Public Pollution Abatement
This section analyzes an issue not explicitly examined by the relevant literature. It
examines the eﬀect of an increase in pollution taxes on domestic and foreign public
pollution abatement and how it is aﬀected by capital mobility. From the Appendix it is
6easily derived that a higher pollution tax causes a capital outﬂo wf r o mt h eh o m ec o u n t r y
(i.e.,(dK/dt)=
−RtK
H < 0), and thus a capital inﬂow to the foreign country. The eﬀect of























where H = R∗
K∗K∗ + RKK and is negative.
Equation (11) indicates that the eﬀect of a higher (t) on (g) is through its eﬀect on
home country government revenue. In particular, the higher (t) entails a direct positive
eﬀect on government revenue (i.e., −Rt/Pg), which enhances the public sector’s ability to
provide (g), and an indirect negative eﬀect (i.e., −t(Rtt/Pg−R2
tK/HPg))w h i c hm i t i g a t e s
its ability for the provision of (g). Intuitively the direct positive eﬀect indicates that at a
given level of pollution (−Rt) ah i g h e r(t) raises government revenue, and thus the level of
(g) provided by the public sector. On the other hand, the higher (t) reduces government
pollution tax revenue in two ways. First, pollution falls directly as a result of the higher
(t) (i.e.,−tRtt/Pg < 0). Second, it causes a reduction in RK w h i c hi nt u r nc a u s e sa
capital outﬂo wa n dt h u sar e d u c t i o ni np o l l u t i o n( i . e . ,−tR2
tK/HPg). In the absence
of capital mobility this last eﬀect does not exist. Therefore, the existence of capital
mobility decreases the ability of the increase in pollution taxes to increase public pollution
abatement. For a small (t) (i.e. t ' 0) an increase in its level unambiguously raises
government pollution tax revenue and, thus the provision of (g), through the induced
direct positive eﬀect.












Equation (12) indicates that a higher pollution tax level by the home country raises
public sector pollution abatement in the foreign country. Intuitively, a higher (t) lowers
RK, induces an inﬂow of capital in the foreign country, which in turn raises the level
of foreign pollution. That results in higher pollution tax revenue in the foreign country,
thus enhancing the public sector’s ability to provide public pollution abatement. Note
that in the absence of capital mobility a change in t does not aﬀect g∗.
73 Taxes, Pollution and Welfare
In this section we examine the eﬀect of a higher domestic pollution tax (t) on net pollution
in the two countries, (r) and (r∗) a n do nl e v e l so fn a t i o n a lw e l f a r e(u) and (u∗).A n a l o g o u s
results are stated for the eﬀects of a higher tax (t∗) on the aforementioned variables. We
also examine the eﬀects of higher lump-sum taxes, T and T∗ for each country respectively,
on the corresponding level of national welfare. The eﬀect of environmental policy on
pollution in the presence of capital mobility are examined in other studies as well (e.g.
Rauscher (1991), Copeland and Taylor (1997)).
3.1 Pollution Taxes and Net Pollution
The eﬀect of a higher pollution (t) on domestic net pollution (r) can be derived as follows.































where ∆ = HPgP∗
g∗ and is negative. Intuitively, equation (13) shows that a higher
tax (t) aﬀects domestic net pollution (r), ﬁrst through its impact on public abatement
i nt h eh o m ea n df o r e i g nc o u n t r i e s .T h i se ﬀect is ignored by the literature that does
not account for public pollution abatement. Second, it aﬀects (r) through changes in
domestic and foreign levels of pollution. In particular, changes in domestic pollution
(z) are due to changes in the domestic pollution tax (direct eﬀect) and changes in the
domestic capital stock (indirect eﬀect). Both eﬀects lead to a reduction of (z).O nt h e
other hand, the higher (t) aﬀects foreign pollution (z∗) indirectly through changes in the
foreign country’s capital stock (K∗).T h i se ﬀect increases (z∗) and through cross-border
pollution it increases (r).17
Equivalently, the eﬀect of the higher pollution tax (t) on net foreign pollution (r∗) is
shown to be
17 Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri, and Michael (2002a) ignore these last two eﬀects on pollution because they



































Observing the reduced forms of equations (13) and (14) we state suﬃcient conditions
under which an increase in (t) reduces net pollution (r) i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ya n d(r∗) in
the foreign country, in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a two-country region where there is perfect regional capital mo-
bility and cross-border pollution, and where pollution tax revenue in each country is ear-
marked for the provision of a public pollution abatement. Then, a suﬃcient condition
for an increase in (t) to reduce (r) and (r∗) is that (Pg >t ) in the home country and
(P∗
g∗ <t ∗) in the foreign country.
It is worth noting that in the absence of cross-border pollution, i.e., Θ = Θ∗ =0 ,w e
get the following results:
1. (dr/dt) < 0 if (Pg >t ) and (dr∗/dt) < 0 if (P∗
g∗ <t ∗),a n d
2. changes in one country’s pollution tax aﬀects the other country’s net pollution
through the induced regional capital mobility.
In the absence of public sector pollution abatement and of cross-border pollution in
both countries, i.e., Θ = Θ∗ =0 , we unambiguously obtain that dr/dt < 0 and dr∗/dt > 0.
In the absence of public sector abatement but in the presence of cross-border pollution,
i.e. Θ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0, dr/dt < 0 and dr∗/dt < 0 if RtK = R∗
t∗K∗. Analogous results
are inferred for an increase in the foreign country’s pollution tax (t∗) o nt h eh o m ea n d
foreign countries’ levels of net pollution.
3.2 Lump-sum Taxes, Pollution Taxes and Welfare
In this section, we examine the welfare eﬀects of small changes in policy variables and
we show how the existence of public pollution abatement and capital mobility alter the
9existing results. Diﬀerentiating equation (5) gives
du = Erdg + ΘErdg








∗ − dT, (15)
where for simplicity we set Eu =1 . The ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side of equation
(15) show that, other things being equal, a higher level of public pollution abatement at
home or abroad increases welfare. The coeﬃcient of dK shows that the inﬂow of capital in
t h eh o m ec o u n t r ya ﬀects domestic welfare in two ways. First, it aﬀects welfare positively
through lower payments to foreign capital operating at home (i.e., −kfRKK > 0), and
second, it aﬀects welfare through induced changes in the levels of pollution at home and
abroad (i.e., Er(RtK − ΘR∗
t∗K∗)). In the absence of cross-border pollution (i.e., Θ =0 )
the inﬂow of capital has a negative impact on welfare through this term, but still an
ambiguous one overall. On the other hand, if Θ > 0, then the regional capital mobility,
which reduces K∗ and lowers cross-border pollution, exerts a positive impact on welfare
through the term −ErΘR∗
t∗K∗.
A higher local environmental tax (t) exerts a positive impact on domestic welfare
through a lower level of domestic pollution (i.e.,ErRtt > 0),a n dt h r o u g hal o w e rr a t eo fr e -
turn on capital, and thus payments to foreign capital operating domestically (i.e.,−kfRKt >
0). But, a higher level of (t) also exerts a negative impact on welfare since it entails the
allocation of more resources to private abatement, thus the reduction of private incomes
and welfare (i.e.,Rt < 0). Finally, a higher level of the foreign environmental tax (t∗),i n
the presence of cross-border pollution, or a lower level of domestic lump-sum taxes (T),
ceteris paribus, unambiguously raise home welfare. Analogous results can be derived for
the foreign country by totally diﬀerentiating equation (9).
Now we turn our attention to the eﬀects of lump-sum taxes and pollution taxes on
national welfare in the two countries. In particular, using the Appendix, the eﬀect of an















10where Sg ≡ (Er−Pg) and S∗
g∗ ≡ (E∗
r∗ −P∗
g∗). We say that the public pollution abatement
is locally under(over)-provided in the home country if Sg > 0(< 0), a n di nt h ef o r e i g n
country if S∗
g∗ > 0(< 0). Therefore, raising lump-sum taxes is unambiguously welfare im-
proving (deteriorating) if the public pollution abatement is locally under (over)-provided.
Public pollution abatement is locally optimally provided in the home (foreign) country if
Sg =0 ( S∗
g∗ =0 ˙ ).T h a ti s ,i fEr = Pg (E∗
r∗ = P∗
g∗). This is the Samuelson rule for optimal
public good provision within each country. In this context public pollution abatement is
a public good.
Using the Appendix and equations (15) and (13), the welfare eﬀect of an increase in
home country’s pollution tax (t) on its own welfare is given by
du
dt






























Equation (18) shows that the increase in (t) aﬀects the home country’s level of welfare
i nt h r e ew a y s . T h eh i g h e r(t) induces, ﬁrst, a transfer of additional resources from
production of goods to pollution abatement by private producers. As a result real income,
and, therefore, welfare is reduced (i.e., Rt < 0). Second, it aﬀects (u) through changes
in domestic net pollution (i.e., −Er
dr
dt). Namely, since Er is the households’ marginal
willingness to pay for pollution abatement, then −Er
dr
dt is a measure of the marginal
beneﬁt/damage of changes in (r) due to the increase in (t) on households’ utility. Through
this term, the increase in (t) increases (u) if dr
dt < 0 (see suﬃcient conditions for this result
in Proposition (1)). Third, the term −kf(RKt + RKK
dK
dt ) captures the eﬀect of (t) on
(u) through changes in payments to foreign capital operating at home. This change in
payments to kf is due to changes in the domestic marginal revenue product of capital,
RK, induced by the higher (t). Namely, by assumption, a higher (t) reduces RK and thus
payments to kf. In addition, as previously discussed, dK
dt < 0 causing an increase in the
marginal revenue product of capital and thus an increase in payments to kf.I tc a nb e
shown, however, that the positive direct eﬀect (−kfRKt) always dominates the negative
indirect eﬀect (−kfRKK
dK
dt ). Thus, the overall impact of (t) on (u) through changes in
payments to kf is positive, as shown by the last term, (i.e., −∆−1kfRtKR∗
K∗K∗PgP∗
g∗), of
the reduced form of equation (18).
11Public pollution abatement aﬀects (du/dt) through its eﬀect on (dr/dt).A s s h o w n i n
Section 3.1 the eﬀect of public pollution abatement on (dr/dt) is ambiguous. Therefore,
its eﬀect on welfare is also ambiguous but of the opposite sign. In the absence of
capital mobility a small increase in pollution taxes, increases g (equation (11)), decreases
r (equation (13)), and increases u (equation (18)).











































Equation (19) shows that an increase in (t) aﬀects (u∗), through, ﬁrst, its eﬀect on
net pollution, (r∗), and second through its eﬀect on repatriated payments of its capital
operating in the home country. The discussion of the ﬁrst eﬀect follows the discussion of
equation (14), and the discussion of the second one follows that of equation (18). Just as
above, public pollution abatement aﬀects (du∗/dt) through its eﬀect on (dr∗/dt).F r o m
the discussion in Section 3.1 this eﬀect is ambiguous and therefore its eﬀect on (du∗/dt)
is also ambiguous but of the opposite sign.
Analogously, using the Appendix, the reduced form expressions of an increase in (t∗)























































The discussion of equations (20) and of (21) is analogous to that of equations (18) and
of (19).
124 Optimal Lump-sum and Pollution Taxes
In this section we derive and discuss the properties of the optimal pollution taxes, (t)
and (t∗) , and lump-sum taxes, T and T∗, in the two countries, under two alternative
cases depending on whether or not there exists tax policy cooperation between the two
countries. One of the advantages of including public pollution abatement into the model
is that equilibrium pollution taxes are given as a function of the cost of providing pollution
abatement.
4.1 Cooperative Taxes and Welfare
A standard result in the literature of environmental economics is that in the presence
of cross-border pollution externalities optimal policy requires either the adoption of co-
operative policies among regions or the mandate of policies by a central (e.g., federal)
authority.18 Here, we begin our analysis of tax policy choices by presenting the ﬁrst-best
policy choices of the region. This regime entails the simultaneous cooperative choice
of lump-sum and pollution taxes that maximize the two countries’ joint welfare. This
regime constitutes a benchmark solution to which the Nash equilibrium results to follow
are compared. Even though for the purposes of our analysis this case is used only as
a benchmark, in a region with deep economic integration (e.g., the EU), this may be a
plausible equilibrium.
4.1.1 Cooperative Lump-sum Taxes and Welfare





dT ∗ =0 ,w h e r edu
dT and du∗
dT ∗ are given by equations (16) and (17), respectively.







18Hoel and Shapiro (2001) in a multi-regional multi-emissions model of transboundary pollution demon-
strates that with free and costless population mobility amongst them, the eﬃcient policy (e.g., regional
contribution to environmental degradation, local pollution taxes, and inter-regional transfers) outcome
is a Nash equilibrium game among the regions. Since, however, multiple Nash equilibria are likely, policy







.( 2 3 )
From equations (16), (17), (22) and (23) we get that the cooperative ﬁrst-best policy
choice for provision of public abatement requires that










g∗.( 2 5 )
Intuitively, a unit of pollution generated at home causes Er damage in the home country
and Θ∗E∗
r∗ damage in the foreign country. Thus ¯ Er ≡ (Er +Θ∗E∗
r∗) is the global damage
caused by a unit of locally generated pollution. Similarly ¯ E∗
r∗ ≡ (E∗
r∗ + ΘEr) is the
global damage caused by a unit of foreign generated pollution. Therefore, ¯ Er ( ¯ E∗
r) is the
global marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement of the domestically (foreign)
generated pollution. When ¯ Er −Pg > 0(< 0) we say that the public pollution abatement
in the home country is globally under-provided (over-provided), and when ¯ Er = Pg ,t h e
public pollution abatement in the home country is globally optimally provided. Similar
deﬁnitions apply for the foreign country.
Equations (24) and (25) indicate that maximizing joint welfare requires that lump-
sum taxes in each country are set at a level where the global marginal willingness to pay
for pollution abatement for pollution generated in each country equals the unit cost of
providing it (i.e., ¯ Er = Pg and ¯ E∗
r∗ = P∗
g∗) . Note that these two equations represent
the relevant Samuelson rule for optimal provision of public (pollution abatement) goods.
Moreover, because of the existence of cross-border pollution, the relevant Samuelson rule
accounts not only for the marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement within a
country, but also for the marginal willingness to pay for it in the other country.
4.1.2 Cooperative Pollution Taxes and Welfare





dt∗ =0 ,w h e r edu
dt,a n ddu∗
dt are given by equations (18) and (19), respectively.
Moreover, the reduced form equations for the expressions du∗
dt∗ and du
dt∗ are given by equa-
t i o n s( 2 0 )a n d( 2 1 ) .I ng e n e r a l ,t h ec o o p e r a t i v ep o l l u t i o nt a x e sf o rt h et w oc o u n t r i e sa r e
14given by
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where the denominator of equations (26) and (27) is positive, and ˆ Sg = ¯ Er − Pg and
ˆ S∗
g∗ = ¯ E∗
r∗ − P∗
g∗. It is important to note that the cooperative pollution taxes (tc) and
(t∗c) are independent of (kf). Intuitively, payments to foreign capital operating in the
home country constitute a direct income transfer from the home to the foreign country.
Therefore, the income loss of the home country exactly outweighs the income beneﬁto f
t h ef o r e i g nc o u n t r y ,a n da ss u c hi td o e sn o ta ﬀect the maximization of their joint welfare.
In the present context of simultaneous cooperative choice of lump-sum (i.e., ˆ Sg =
ˆ S∗
g∗ =0 ) and pollution taxes, equations (26) and (27) reduce to tc = Pg and t∗c = P∗
g∗.19
In this case the cooperative optimal policies require that tc = Pg = ¯ Er.20 However, if
lump-sum taxes were not chosen cooperatively it is possible that tc ≷ Pg and/or t∗c ≷ P∗
g∗.
For example, if each country chooses the level of its lump-sum taxes non-cooperatively
in order to maximize its own welfare, then while the level of public pollution abatement
in each country is locally optimally provided, from the region’s point of view, due to
the cross-border pollution externality, there is global under-provision in both countries
(ˆ Sg = Θ∗E∗
r∗ > 0, and ˆ S∗
g = ΘEr > 0). In this case, tc >P g and t∗c >P ∗
g∗.
Proposition 2 Consider a two-country region with perfect capital mobility, and cross-
border pollution between them. Part of pollution abatement is carried out by the public
sector ﬁnanced by means of lump-sum and pollution taxes. The ﬁrst-best policy choice,
maximizing the countries’ joint welfare, entails their cooperation in choosing both their




Note that cross-border pollution, not regional capital mobility, is the feature of the
model mandating that the two countries choose cooperatively both lump-sum and pol-
19When both policies are chosen cooperatively a small increase in pollution tax in one country reduces
net pollution in both countries (equations (13) and (14)).
20Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri, and Michael (2002b) ﬁn dt h es a m er e s u l tb u ti nt h e i rc a s et h i sr e s u l ta p p l i e s
to Nash taxes and not cooperative taxes.
15lution taxes in attaining the ﬁrst-best policy choice. In the absence of cross-border pol-
lution, the cooperative choice of pollution taxes alone suﬃces for attaining the ﬁrst-best
policy choice.
4.2 Nash Equilibrium Lump-sum and Pollution Taxes
We now derive the optimal Nash lump-sum and pollution taxes for the home and foreign
countries and compare them to the benchmark cooperative case. The two countries
choose these taxes simultaneously. In this non-cooperative game the only interactions
between the two countries relevant to the analysis are those emanating from cross-border
pollution and regional capital mobility.
4.2.1 Nash Lump-sum Taxes
Setting equations (16) and (17) equal to zero, we derive the Nash lump-sum taxes. The
emerging equilibrium conditions require that Nash lump-sum taxes are chosen such that
for the home country Er = Pg and for the foreign country such that E∗
r∗ = P∗
g∗. These
conditions constitute a dominant strategy for each country. That is, each country’s
choice of lump-sum taxes is independent of the other country’s policy choice.
Comparing the Nash optimality conditions to those of the benchmark cooperative
case we derive the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Under the conditions of the model, Nash lump-sum tax levels are lower
than the corresponding cooperative levels.
Proof. Consider the case of the home country. Since Pg is constant and the same




r .21 This implies that EN
r >E C
r . Given that the expenditure function
is assumed strictly convex in (r), we get that rN >r C. A ss h o w nb yt h ec o m p a r a t i v e
statics in the Appendix, an increase in (T) does not aﬀect the level of gross pollution
(z),t h e r e f o r erN >r C implies that gN <g C.A sar e s u l tw eg e tt h a tTN <T C. Similar
reasoning yields T∗N <T ∗C for the foreign country.
Intuitively, the individual governments in setting their lump-sum taxes, do not account
for the fact that because of cross-border pollution (i.e., a negative externality), the other
21The superscripts (N) and (C) denote the variables evaluated at the Nash and the cooperative
equilibrium, respectively.
16country incurs a cost from pollution generated in the ﬁrst country. Therefore, individual
governments by not internalizing this externality set their Nash lump-sum taxes too low.
In contrast, in the cooperative case the two countries accounting for this externality apply
the relevant Samuelson rule for the regional optimal provision of the public pollution
abatement.
4.2.2 Nash Pollution Taxes
Setting (du/dt)=0and (du∗/dt∗)=0in equations (18) and (20), we derive the following
reaction functions:




























Given that the structure of the game is such that lump-sum taxes are locally optimally
chosen (i.e., Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 ), solving simultaneously equations (28) and (29) gives the
following expressions for each country’s Nash pollution taxes.22
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t∗K∗] and is positive.
From equations (30) and (31) we note that when lump-sum taxes are locally optimally
chosen, the eﬀect of pollution taxes on payments to foreign capital operating in the home
country constitute the only diﬀerence between the Nash and cooperative tax rates.
Observing the above expressions we note that in general the Nash pollution taxes can
be greater or smaller than the unit cost of the public pollution abatement, as opposed to
the benchmark case of cooperative choice of both instruments. We resolve some of this
ambiguity by stating the following Proposition, which considers some special cases.
Proposition 4 Under the conditions of the model
1. if Θ =0 ,t h e ntN >t c = Pg.
22The general expressions for the Nash pollution taxes when lump-sum taxes are not chosen optimally
are given in the Appendix.
172. If Θ∗ =0 ,t h e nt∗N <t ∗c = P∗
g∗.
3. If the two countries are symmetric in the sense that Er = E∗
r∗ and RKK = R∗
K∗K∗,
then tN >t c and t∗N <t ∗c.
4. If countries are identical, then kf =0and tN = tc = Pg, t∗N = t∗c = P∗
g∗.
The proof of Proposition (4) follows from equations (30) and (31). Intuitively, the ﬁrst
two cases of Proposition (4) are directly derived from the assumption that home is the
capital-importing and foreign is the capital-exporting country, and from the assumption
that pollution is a capital intensive good in both countries. That is, the inﬂow of capital
in the home country raises pollution, thus leading to a higher domestic Nash pollution
tax level. The reverse holds for the foreign capital-exporting country. The intuition of
the third case is as follows. Payments to foreign capital operating in the home country
reduce real income, and thus lower the domestic households’ marginal willingness to pay
for pollution abatement (i.e., Eru > 0). As a result, at a constant pollution tax (t),n e t
pollution generated at home (i.e., z − g) rises. At the same time, the opposite holds in
the foreign country, i.e., z∗−g∗ falls. If the two countries are symmetric, and since Θ ≤ 1
and Θ∗ ≤ 1, then net pollution (r = z − g + Θ(z∗ − g∗)) in the home country rises, and
net pollution (r∗ = z∗ − g∗ + Θ∗(z − g)) in the foreign country falls. Therefore, we get
that in the home country tN >t c, and in the foreign country t∗N <t ∗c. Finally, in the
last case where the two countries are identical (i.e. kf =0 )t h e r ea r en op a y m e n t st o
foreign capital operating at home, and thus the cooperative and Nash pollution tax levels
a r et h es a m e .I ti si m p o r t a n t ,h o w e v e r ,t on o t et h a ti ft h et w oc o u n t r i e sa r ei d e n t i c a l
and cooperate only in choosing their pollution taxes, while lump-sum taxes are chosen
non-cooperatively (Nash taxes), then tc >t N = Pg and t∗c >t ∗N = P∗
g∗.
One of the key features of our model is that contrary to most of the literature we
allow countries to be non-identical. We next examine how diﬀerences between the two
countries aﬀect optimal taxes. To do so consider ﬁrst the case where the two countries
are identical. If countries are identical, the return on capital is identical and kf =0 .
In that case, if both taxes are chosen optimally tN = tc = Pg and t∗N = t∗c = P∗
g∗ and
from Proposition 3, TN <T c and T∗N <T ∗c. Therefore, if countries are identical and
both taxes are chosen optimally there is no need for cooperation in pollution taxes since
Nash taxes are eﬃcient. However, there is scope for cooperation in lump sum taxes. If,
on the other hand, the two countries are non-identical and choose both taxes optimally,
18Nash pollution taxes are not eﬃcient. From Proposition 3 we still get that TN <T c and
T∗N <T ∗c. Proposition 4 summarizes the suﬃcient conditions for tN >t c and t∗N <t ∗c.
5 Capital Mobility and the Eﬀect of Pollution Taxes
on net Pollution
In what follows we examine how, ceteris paribus, regional capital mobility alters the
eﬀectiveness of pollution taxes in reducing net pollution. The analysis utilizes diﬀerent
initial conditions according to whether or not the two countries act cooperatively in choos-
ing optimally their policy instruments (i.e., lump-sum and/or pollution taxes). Namely,
we examine how capital mobility aﬀects the impact of an increase in pollution taxes on
net pollution (i.e., dr/dt) in each of the two cases in Section 4, that is, when (i) the two
countries choose their policies cooperatively and (ii) both countries choose their policies
non-cooperatively (Nash). This in itself is another analytical novelty of the present pa-
per. That is, while some of the previously reviewed studies examine the eﬀects of capital
mobility on pollution levels, to the best of our knowledge, none of them examines the im-
pact of capital mobility on the eﬀectiveness of the optimally chosen environmental policy
instruments in reducing net pollution.23
Consider the case of no regional capital mobility. Then, in both cases, when lump-
sum taxes are optimally chosen, cooperatively in the cooperative case (i.e., ˆ Sg = ˆ S∗
g∗ =0 )
and non-cooperatively in the Nash case (i.e., Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 ), the optimal pollution tax
equals the unit price of the public pollution abatement in both countries. This is easily
observed from equations (26) and (27) in the case of the cooperative equilibrium, and
from equations (30) and (31) in the case of non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Moreover,
equation (13), and its counterpart for the foreign country (i.e., dr∗/dt∗) indicate that
raising the pollution tax, unambiguously reduces local net pollution.24 Note that the
ﬁrst two right-hand-side terms in the reduced form of equation (13), are due to regional
capital mobility.
Assuming the existence of regional capital mobility, we ﬁrst consider the case where
the two countries choose cooperatively both their lump-sum and pollution taxes in order
23Damania (2000) deﬁnes the eﬀectiveness of environmental policy in the same way but looks at the
impact of environmental policy on the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms.
24It is easily shown that when lump-sum taxes are optimally chosen, and in the absence of regional
capital mobility, (dr/dt)=−∆−1P∗
g∗Rt < 0, and similarly, (dr/dt)=−∆−1PgR∗
t∗ < 0.
19to maximize their joint welfare. In this case, the cooperative pollution taxes equal the
prices of public pollution abatement in each country and thus the eﬀect of pollution
taxes on net pollution is not aﬀected by the presence of capital mobility when evaluated
at the cooperative equilibrium. If, however, the two countries cooperate in their choice of
pollution taxes but choose lump-sum taxes non-cooperatively, so as to each maximize its
own welfare, then the eﬀect of capital mobility is ambiguous. For zero or small Θ, capital
mobility reduces the eﬀectiveness of the increase in pollution taxes on net pollution.25
Similarly, for small Θ∗, the presence of capital mobility increases dr∗/dt∗.
Next, we examine how capital mobility aﬀects the impact of an increase in the home
pollution tax on its net pollution evaluated at Nash equilibrium. The following Propo-
sition summarizes the results:
Proposition 5 Within the assumptions of the model, the presence of capital mobility
decreases (increases) the eﬀectiveness of an increase in the pollution tax on net pollution
evaluated at Nash26 for the capital importing (exporting) country if i) Θ =0( Θ∗ =0 )
and Θ∗ ≥ 0( Θ ≥ 0) and ii) when Θ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0 and both countries are symmetric
in the sense that Er = E∗
r∗ and RKK = R∗
K∗K∗.
Intuitively, when Θ =0the residents of the home country are only aﬀected by changes
in, z−g. Capital mobility aﬀects both z and g. The increase in t leads to an outﬂow of
capital from the home to the foreig nc o u n t r y ,w h i c hi nt u r nl o w e r sz. On the other hand
the eﬀect on g is negative since the capital outﬂow reduces pollution and thus pollution
tax revenue. At Nash tN >P g and thus the eﬀect on g is smaller than that on z, and thus
z−g is reduced. In the presence of transboundary pollution (i.e. Θ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0) the
same result holds if the two countries are symmetric. The intuition is the same as that
following Proposition (4). It is important to note that if the two countries are identical
the presence of capital mobility does not aﬀect the impact of the pollution tax on net
pollution.
25In other words it increases dr/dt. The more negative dr/dt i st h em o r ee ﬀective t is in reducing net
pollution.
26Nash equilibrium refers to the case where the two countries apply their Nash lump-sum taxes and
their Nash pollution taxes simultaneously.
206C o n c l u s i o n
One of the most important concerns over the process of globalization is its impact
on the environment. Environmentalists fear, among other things, that increased interna-
tional capital mobility will lead to a deterioration of the global environment since in an
eﬀort to attract capital, countries will engage in a “race to the bottom” in environmental
standards. Since pollution is not conﬁned within national borders, this will lead to the
deterioration of the neighboring countries environment. Triggered by such concerns a
relatively new literature has addressed various aspects of the interaction between inter-
national capital mobility and the quality of the environment. The contribution of the
paper to this emerging literature is twofold. First, following ample real world evidence,
it allows for pollution abatement provided by the public sector in addition to abatement
of pollution by the private sector. The paper also assumes, motivated by empirical ev-
idence, that pollution tax revenue raised by the government is earmarked to ﬁnance its
own abatement activity. Within this framework, we examine, among other things, the
optimal cooperative and Nash taxes. Second, while the related studies have focused on
the impact of capital mobility on national and global levels of pollution, we focus on the
impact of capital mobility on the eﬀectiveness of pollution taxes in reducing net pollution,
as well.
To address these issues, the paper presents a model of a region with two non-identical
countries with cross border pollution, free trade in goods and perfect capital mobility
within the region. Pollution, a by-product of production adversely aﬀects welfare and is
abated by the private and public sectors in both countries. The government uses revenue
collected from pollution and lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance public pollution abatement. This
framework enables us to relate the optimal pollution tax policies with the marginal cost
of public pollution abatement.
We show, among other things, that the ﬁrst-best policy is achieved when both coun-
tries choose both tax instruments cooperatively and requires that the optimal pollution
tax in each country is equal to the unit cost of public pollution abatement and to the
global damage caused by a unit of pollution generated by that country. In this case, the
presence of regional capital mobility has no impact on the eﬀectiveness of pollution taxes
in reducing net pollution. If, however, each country chooses only the pollution taxes
cooperatively, while lump-sum taxes are chosen non-cooperatively (i.e., to maximize its
21own welfare), then from the regions’ perspective, due to cross-border pollution, there
is under-provision of public pollution abatement, and the cooperative pollution tax is
greater than the unit cost of public pollution abatement. In this case, the presence of
capital mobility reduces the eﬀectiveness of the pollution tax on net pollution for each
country when cross-border pollution is small. When each country acts non-cooperatively,
in order to maximize its own welfare, then i) the non-cooperative lump-sum taxes are
lower than the cooperative ones, and ii) the Nash pollution tax is expected to be greater
(smaller) than its cooperative level for the capital importing (exporting) country.
If the two countries are identical, then i) in the Nash equilibrium, the Nash pollu-
tion tax is equal to the cooperative one and ii) capital mobility has no impact on the
eﬀectiveness of pollution taxes on net pollution.
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